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Abstract:  Community-based natural resource management is an important strategy to conserve 
and sustainably use biodiversity and wildlife in Namibia.  This paper examines the extent to 
which conservancies have been successful in meeting their primary goal of improving the lives of 
rural households.  It evaluates the benefits of community conservancies in Namibia by asking 
three questions:  (a) Do conservancies  increase household welfare? (b) Are conservancies pro-
poor?  (c) And, do participants in conservancies gain more relative to those who choose not to 
participate?  The analysis is based on a 2002 survey covering seven conservancies and 1,192 
households.  The results suggest that community conservancies have a positive impact on 
household welfare. This impact is poverty-neutral in some regions and pro-poor in others. 
Further, welfare benefits from conservancies appear to be some what evenly distributed between 
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Management?  An Evaluation of Community Conservancies in Namibia  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has 
become an important strategy to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and wildlife in 
Africa.  Projects such as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe and ADMADE in Zambia are well 
known examples and have motivated other programs in Africa (Newman and Webster 
1993).    Namibia’s community conservancy program is somewhat different.  It was 
largely shaped by the presence of successful commercial conservancies that form a multi-
million pound wildlife industry (Jones and Murphree 2001).  Nonetheless, in the last 10 
years, Nambia’s conservancy program has developed into an important road map for 
sustainable rural development. 
 
Most community-based wildlife management programs try to meet at least two complex 
goals:  conservation of nature, and economic empowerment of rural households.  The 
underlying premise is that communities can profit from wildlife management if they are 
given sufficient authority and control over wildlife resources.  Thus, such programs 
invariably involve some devolution of state authority over wildlife management to either 
community or district government organizations, increased community involvement in 
protection of fauna and flora, new jobs created through increased tourism, protection, or 
NGO activities, and benefits to rural households either directly or indirectly through 
community projects.   The community conservancy program in Namibia shares some of 
the same characteristics.  It accords communities with rights over wildlife resources if 
they are able to identify conservancy boundaries, have a well-defined membership, 
choose a representative committee to implement programs and develop an acceptable 
constitution (Jones 2001).  The local villagers benefit by being able to negotiate contracts 
with tourism agencies, manage guards and game-hunting activities, and make decisions 
about revenue sources and uses. 
 
In our paper, we seek to evaluate the impacts of Namibia’s conservancy program.  We 
focus on one of its primary goals, i.e., improving the lives of rural households.  
Community conservancies in Namibia are still evolving.  Thus, evaluating impacts at this 
stage should provide some useful insights for planning and further development of the 
conservancy program.   
 
We assess the benefits of community conservancies by asking three specific questions:  
(a) Do conservancies increase household welfare? (b) Are conservancies pro-poor i.e. do 
they improve the welfare of  poorer households relative to the less poor?  (c) And, do 
self-defined conservancy participants gain more from conservancies relative to those who   3
choose not to participate?  Our analysis is based on a survey of approximately 1,000 
households in seven conservancies within the Kunene and Caprivi regions of Namibia.   
 
We use quantitative program evaluation techniques to determine the impacts of 
conservancy creation.  We first assess whether households in established conservancies 
are better off relative to households in new conservancies.  Thus, our control group is 
comprised of households in recent conservancies while our treatment group is made up of 
households in more established conservancies.  We evaluate household income and three 
other income-expenditure measures of household welfare and ask whether differences in 
these measures can be attributed to the presence of conservancies.   By analyzing impacts 
on four indicators of household welfare, we examine the robustness of our results.  Our 
results suggest that community conservancies have a positive impact on household 
welfare. We also conclude that this impact is poverty-neutral in Kunene and pro-poor in 
Caprivi.  
 
The second part of our paper focuses on households that report that they are participants 
in conservancies.  We restrict our analyses to established conservancies and ask whether 
there are significant welfare gains to participating households.  While a simple perusal of 
data suggests that participants are indeed better off, statistical analysis (controlling for 
differences amongst households) leads to more ambiguous results.  We find that there is 
little difference in welfare gains between participants and non-participants.  Thus, 
welfare benefits from conservancy appear to be evenly distributed between participant 
and non-participant households.   
 
In interpreting our results, we need to consider whether household income-expenditure 
measures are reasonable indicators of overall well-being.  Conservancy benefits accrue in 
the form of communal public goods as well as household income.  To the extent that 
these public goods impact income, household welfare measures are adequate.  However, 
to the extent that household income measures do not fully capture all the benefits created 
by conservancies, our analyses may be underestimating the returns from community 
management.   Our results suggest that households living in established conservancies 
gain relative to comparator groups, yet participants themselves may not see noteworthy 
benefits.  We interpret these results to mean that the community benefits of conservancies 
dominate individual benefits and these community benefits are beginning to have an 
indirect and positive impact on households. 
 
2.  Background on Community Conservancies in Namibia 
 
CBNRM in Namibia illustrates the nature of the challenge such activities pose and the 
role of historical artifacts in shaping community efforts.  In 1968, Namibian colonial 
authorities granted white commercial farmers conditional rights over certain wildlife 
species, and allowed them to use and exploit wildlife for game and trophy hunting and 
tourism (see Jones and Murphree (2001) for a detailed account). These rights were 
reinforced through the passage of the Nature Conservation Ordinance of 1975 (Barnes 
and De Jager, 1996).  Individual farmers pooled their land to provide wildlife with the 
required habitat, and created large private conservancies.  There are currently 24 private   4
commercial conservancies, covering an area of around four million hectares.  These 
commercial conservancies include 900 farms and make up 42% of total conservation 
areas in Namibia. 
 
In 1995, the post-independent government laid out a set of progressive access rules for 
communal lands.
1  Under a new ‘Policy on Wildlife Management, Utilization and 
Tourism in Communal Lands,’ communal conservancies or areas where communities 
could economically exploit and gain from wildlife resource management were created 
(Jones and Murphree 2001).  The first communal conservancy, the Torra Conservancy, 
was created in 1998.  Several others have since been established, resulting in 29 
registrations by 2003 and encompassing a total area of more than 74,000 square 
kilometers of wildlife habitat.   
 
Community conservancies complement the ecosystem and biodiversity benefits provided 
by Namibia’s protected area system. Namibia has a total area of 110,000 square 
kilometers designated as proclaimed state land for conservation. Out of the 29 registered 
conservancies, 17 of these either border or are located between conservation areas. This 
implies an additional 47,515 square kilometers of land adjacent to protected areas for 
cooperative conservation management. Wildlife, as a result, is presented with more 
opportunities for mobility and flexibility between seasons. This is of particular 
significance during times of drought or poor rainfall distribution.    
 
So far, few studies have quantitatively assessed the impact of Namibia’s community 
programs.  However, Brian Jones (1999b), in a review article of community conservation 
in Namibia, is able to provide detailed anecdotal evidence.  He concludes that 
conservancies have had a positive impact on natural resource stocks.  For example, 
wildlife numbers in the Kunene region improved significantly through the late 1990s.   
Poaching appears to have declined in Kunene as well as parts of Caprivi.  In terms of 
welfare benefits, Jones determines that communities have benefited in cash and kind.  
These rewards accrue at the community-level as well as household level.  For example, at 
the end of 1998, the Torra conservancy had gained some $40,000 from profit-sharing 
agreements with a tourist lodge.  Meat distribution is another important benefit.  Other 
monetary revenues include cash for services to lodges, bed-night levies, wages for guards 
and other employment, and income from sale of skins (Jones 1999b).  
 
Barnes and others (2002) analyze the financial and economic returns to investments in 
five conservancies, including some studied here. Several years of financial records and 
future conservancy management plans were combined into 10 year cost-benefit models, 
measuring the merits of conservancy investment from the perspectives of the project, the 
national economy, and the communities themselves. The results showed that, at least 
collectively (at the conservancy level), communities which invest in conservancy 
development can expect high returns on their investment. The study did not examine the 
distributional patterns associated with, or planned for, these returns.     
                                                 
1 Communal land refers to areas where property is commonly held and with some form of Traditional 
Authority in place. However all communal land in Namibia belongs to the state.   5
 
2.  Data  
 
For our analysis, we use data from a household survey conducted in 2002 by the Wildlife 
Integration for Livelihood Diversification (WILD) project and the Environmental 
Economics Unit of the Directorate of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism.  The survey includes 1,192 households in seven conservancies from two 
regions, Kunene and Caprivi. 
 
The survey does not include any households living outside the seven conservancies.  As a 
result, we cannot evaluate conservancies by comparing household living outside 
conservancies with those living within conservancies.  To overcome this data limitation 
we utilize the fact that the full benefits from a conservancy can be achieved only after the 
conservancy has been in operation for several years.  Thus, we distinguish between two 
types of conservancies, “established” and “comparator.” We then evaluate differences in 
income measures between these two types of conservancies.   
 
Established conservancies include those that were started on or before 1998.
2  These 
comprise Torra and ≠Khoadi //Hoâs in Kunene, and, Salambala in Caprivi.  In contrast, 
the comparator conservancies were started in or after 1999. Thus, Sorris Sorris, and Ehi-
Rovi Puka in Kunene and Mayuni and Kwandu in Caprivi are comparator conservancies.  
The difference in the starting date for comparator and established conservancies is one 
year in Caprivi, and 3 to 4 years in Kunene.  As a result, we expect the differential impact 
of conservancies to be underestimated in Caprivi.  We present the Caprivi results for 
completeness.  
 
Table 1 summarizes household income, education, and other characteristics for each 
conservancy in the sample.  The three high household income conservancies are Torra, 
Salambala, and Kwandu.  These are also the three conservancies with a higher proportion 
of households with education of grade 10 or above.  Table 1 also indicates that the 
dominant occupation in the two regions is subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing.  
Approximately 40% of the surveyed households are female-headed. 
 
Table 2 shows the relationship between households and conservancies.  This includes 
information on participation, income from conservancies, conservancy awareness, and 
benefits.  
 
The WILD survey recorded the number of persons in a household who were conservancy 
members.  Some households reported all infants and children as well as adults to be 
members of the conservancy, while others reported only adults to be members.  To avoid 
problems from such data inconsistency, we define participant households as those with at 
least one member.  The highest participation is in the oldest conservancy – 75% of 
households in Torra conservancy are participants.  Overall, 34% of the households 
                                                 
2 While conservancies were formally registered only in the mid-nineties, community conservation activities 
had started in some of the conservancies in the 1980s.   6
consider themselves as participants in all conservancies.  On average, 26% of the 
households reported that they knew about conservancy constitutions. 
 
The average household income from conservancies is derived from total income reported 
by household members and their corresponding occupational status related to the 
conservancy (Type B).  Type B occupation includes direct employment as well as wage 
and enterprise income indirectly arising from the conservancy. Individual conservancy 
incomes are added to obtain household conservancy income.
3  Except for Torra, average 
incomes from conservancies are lower than average household income.  This shows that 
households who obtain income from conservancies also have other sources of income.  
On average only 12 percent of the households sampled reported any income from 
conservancies.   
 
Table 2 also shows that there are non-income related benefits that accrue from 
conservancies.  In Kunene region, a majority of the households in established 
conservancies considers distribution of meat as a key conservancy benefit.  For example, 
76% of households in Torra and 62% of households in ≠Khoadi //Hoâs indicated meat 
distribution to be a conservancy related gain.  We were unable to include such non-
income assistance in our analyses. 
 
Table 3 compares households in established versus comparator conservancies.  The 
average income of households in established conservancies is higher than that of 
comparator conservancy households.  Thus, it may appear that the differences in 
household income are a result of the conservancy influence.  However, the average level 
of male and female education in the established conservancies is also higher.  It is also 
appears that established conservancies may have access to slightly better infrastructure.  
A larger percent of households in established conservancies have electricity relative to 
the comparator group. 
 
This table also shows the differences in the sources of livelihood in the two regions.  In 
Kunene, most households reported agriculture as the primary source of livelihood.  In 





The 2002 Socio-Economic Household Survey (SEHS) was designed primarily to evaluate 
the impact of conservancies on household incomes and assess how such impacts vary 
among households with different socio-economic characteristics. Based on our initial 
assessment of the data, we focus on three specific questions:  
                                                 
3 Conservancies provide wage employment and self-employment opportunities, income through hotel 
levies, meat to households and community level income through tourism related contracts and agreements 
(Jones 1999a and 1999b).  Unfortunately, the household survey data does not collect information on 
community related benefits. 
   7
 
(1)  Do conservancies significantly increase household welfare?  
(2)  How does the change in a household’s welfare resulting from a conservancy vary 
by household socio-economic characteristics?   
(3)  Does participation in the conservancy increase household welfare relative to 
those who choose not to participate? 
 
A key concern with the 2002 SEHS is that it collected household information only after 
the implementation of CBNRM programs.  Thus, we do not have the baseline data that is 
particularly useful for conducting program evaluation. Because of this and other 
information limitations related to data inconsistencies, we try to evaluate the impact of 
conservancies by using different methods to cross-check robustness of results.  
 
We measure household welfare using four different indicators: household income and 
expenditure, and per capita income and expenditure. It is often argued that income 
measures are subject to larger measurement errors and more volatile, in particular, in 
countries where agricultural and informal sectors constitute the major part of the 
economy (Deaton, 1997).  In contrast, household expenditure yields a more accurate 




Evaluation of conservancy impact 
 
Method (1): Simple comparison without controls 
 
This method essentially involves comparing the mean income/expenditure between two 
groups of households: those living within conservancies (in our case, established 
conservancies within the region) and those residing outside conservancies (the newly 
established ones). The differences in the mean income (or expenditure) between the two 
groups of households are expected to capture the impact of the conservancies. A 
significant t-test suggests that the existence of conservancies increases household 
welfare.  
 
It should be noted that the simple-comparison-without-controls method is only valid 
when the conservancy is randomly assigned among different localities, i.e. localities with 
and without conservancy programs should have similar observable and unobservable 
characteristics. In reality, such random experiment design is often not possible simply 
because public programs are often intended to improve the welfare of targeted groups. 
Also it is often impossible to randomly assign programs across localities because of 
institutional or political constraints. Another problem is that households may selectively 
migrate to areas where conservancies are more successful, in which case, this method 
will lead to a biased estimate of the conservancy effect. Given the data available and 
limited evidence of selective migration, we assume that the selective migration is less of 
a concern.  
   8
 
Method (2): Multivariate analysis of welfare impacts of conservancies 
 
To control for differences in observable characteristics, we use a model of household 
income determination to evaluate the effect of conservancies. Household welfare is 
treated as a function of household characteristics, and whether that household is residing 
in an established conservancy. 
 
The household income/expenditure equation can be written as:  
 
       ε γ β α + + + = C X y ln   (1) 
 
where y is household income or expenditure. X is a vector of covariates, including a 
dummy for households with highest education between seventh and ninth grade; a 
dummy for households with highest education above tenth grade; a vector of dummies 
for the occupational classification of the head of the household; the number of persons in 
the household between the age of 15 and 65; total crop area of the household, the number 
of months the households harvested fuelwood in past year, a dummy if the household 
reported crop or livestock damage by wildlife; female headed household dummy; and 
livestock and asset indices, which are constructed using the principal component method.  
C is a dummy variable taking the value one for households that reside within an 
established conservancy and zero, otherwise.  
 
The estimated coefficient of C reflects the conservancy impact on household welfare.  
The coefficient can be interpreted as the proportion of household income increase (in the 
semi-log specification) for households living in an established conservancy compared 
with those not living in established conservancies, after controlling for other factors.  
 
It should be noted that estimates of the conservancy effect using cross-sectional data can 
be seriously affected by omitted variable bias and selection bias.
4  There could exist 
geographical and infrastructural characteristics that make certain areas more suitable for 
conservancies as well as affect welfare indicators of households.  For example, better 
roads may result in better access for tourists as well as access to markets.  Thus, better 
existing roads in one area may make it more suitable for conservancy development and 
better access to market stemming from the same road may imply higher income for the 
                                                 
4 To correct the omitted variable bias, we need panel data from before and after establishment of 
conservancies. Unbiased conservancy effects can be obtained from estimating conservancy impact changes 
in household incomes  assuming unobserved area characteristics remain constant over time, i.e. the 
difference-in-difference method (Heckman and Smith, 1999). While the collection of panel data can 
substantially enhance the power of program evaluation, the costs of data collection can also be 
considerably higher. Another way of dealing with omitted variable bias is the instrumental variable method 
(Heckman, 1997).  However, we do not have any conservancy level area characteristics data and no 
suitable instrument variable that may influence establishment of a conservancy in one location but does not 
influence household welfare.  As a result we are unable to use this method to the measure the conservancy 
effect on household welfare. 
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households.  This is unlikely in our study area, but since we do not have the infrastructure 
data, we cannot control for these village / conservancy level characteristics.  
 
It can be argued that even within a program such as a conservancy, the economic benefit 
households derive may differ (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002).  For example, better educated 
households may reap more economic profits relative to less educated households. We test 
for differential conservancy benefits by using a set of interaction dummy variables in 
equation (2) 
 
  ε β β β β α + + + + + = yZ nC nZ C yZ C X y * * * ln 3 2 1   (2) 
 
where X includes all the covariates specified in equation (1), C is the established 
conservancy dummy, nC is the dummy for comparator conservancies, yZ  is a social 
characteristics dummy such as high education,  female-headed households, asset-rich, 
and livestock-rich.  nZ represents either low education, male-headed households, asset-
poor, or livestock-poor. Thus, the coefficient β1 where yZ is high education, for example, 
tells us the additional income gain accruing to higher educated households within 
established conservancies, compared to less educated households within comparator 
conservancies. Households with education attainment of grade 10 and above are defined 
as high education households.  Households in the third quintile or above with respect to 
asset index are defined as asset-rich.  Livestock-rich households are similarly defined in 
terms of livestock index.  The reference group is the nC*nZ (for example, comparator 
conservancy low education).  
 
The differential welfare benefit from established conservancies to households with high 
education is given by (β1 - β2 - β3). That is, if (β1 - β2 - β3) = 0, households with high 
education do not enjoy any extra benefit from established conservancies.  If (β1 - β2 - β3) 
> 0, then high education households gain more from conservancies than low education 
households.  Conversely if (β1 - β2 - β3) < 0, the conservancy benefits may be accruing 
more to low education households.  The interpretation of (β1 - β2 - β3) for female headed 
households, asset-rich households, and livestock-rich households are similar.   
 
Evaluation of economic impact of participation in conservancies 
 
The 2002 survey (table 2) shows that among the 7 conservancies, the proportion of 
household participation in conservancy programs ranges from 16 percent in Mayuni to 75 
percent in ≠Khoadi //Hoâs. To evaluate the impact of participation, we first analyze the 
determination of participation. 
 
   10
Determinants of Participation  
 
We use the following probit model to analyze the determination of participation.  
 
 ) (   1) cipation Prob(Parti VP X γ β ϕ + = =   (3) 
 
Where X includes all the household level covariates as specified in equation (1). The VP 
is the proportion of households reporting to be member of the conservancy at the village 
level.  VP  captures the peer pressure effect of other participating villagers on a 
household.  The function ϕ(.) is a commonly used notation for the standard normal 
distribution. We use the maximum likelihood estimation method to estimate (3). 
 
Evaluation of the impact of participation 
 
Method (1): Simple comparison without controls 
 
The basic idea of this method is outlined in the section on evaluation of conservancy 
impact. To evaluate the participation effect, we use a sub-sample (households who live 
within conservancies) and compare the mean income/expenditure between participating 
and non-participating households.  
 
Method (2): Multivariate analysis  
   
To control for observable household characteristics, we use a income determination 
model, similar to that of equation (1), to evaluate the impact of household participation in 
conservancies.  
 
Household income equation can be written as:  
 
  ε β β α + + + = P X y ln   (4) 
 
Where X has the same set of covariates as in (1). P is a dummy variable, taking value 1 
for participants, and 0 for non-participants.  We assume that participation decision is 
exogenous, rather than a choice variable.
5 This is a strong assumption, and we relax this 
assumption in the next step and test its validity in the analysis.  
 
Similar to the conservancy dummy C in equation (1), the estimated coefficient of P 
reflects the impact of participation in conservancy on household welfare.  The coefficient 
can be interpreted as the proportion of household income increase (in the semi-log 
specification) for participants compared with non-participants after controlling for other 
factors.  
 
                                                 
5 One such situation may be, when all households within a village are automatically made members of the 
conservancy and households are not allowed to opt out of participation.  Another case where this 
assumption is true is where participant households are selected randomly by an outside organization.     11
As with the conservancy analysis, the multivariate estimates of the program effect of 
participation using cross-sectional data can be also be biased due to omitted variables.  
There could exist a correlation between the participation decision and unobserved 
household characteristics, which affects outcome variables.  For example, households 
who are better informed about potential benefits from conservancies are more likely to 
participate in these programs. Very often, such better-informed households also tend to 
be more able to generate higher income. But household characteristics, such as the ability 
to get access to information, are unavailable from the survey, hence the estimation can 
suffer from self-selection bias.  
 
One way of dealing with selection bias (i.e. correlation between the participation decision 
and unobserved household characteristics) is the instrumental variable method 
(Heckman, 1997).   
 
Method (3): Instrument variable method 
 
This method depends crucially on the availability of a valid instrumental variable. We 
argue that the proportion of village-level participation is a potentially valid instrument. 
This variable is correlated with household participation, but does not affect household 
income directly. The instrumental variable method involves an estimation of a two-
equation system: the household's income equation and the participation decision 
equation.   
 
The two estimated equations are equation (3) and (4),  where VP is the instrument 
variable as it measures the peer pressure effect of other participating villagers on a 
household.  The peer pressure influences the participation decision but has no impact on 
the household welfare measures.  We test the hypothesis that participation is 
endogenously determined by each household along with their income and consumption 
decisions.
6 
     
The estimated coefficient of the participation dummy from the two-equation system is 
expected to provide an unbiased estimate of the impact of participation in conservancies 
on household incomes.   
 
                                                 









. The two equations are simultaneously estimated by Maximum Likelihood method. We test 
the hypothesis that the coefficient of participation in the income equation is significantly different from 
zero.  We test the hypothesis that ρ = 0.  
   12
Method-(4): Propensity Score Matching method 
 
The propensity score matching method is regarded as one of the best alternative when 
random experiment design is not possible (Rubin, 1973). This method is particular 
appealing in circumstances where only cross-sectional data are available.  
 
A propensity score is an index that is based on the probability of a household 
participating in the established conservancy programs.  Thus, in this paper, the propensity 
scores are based on estimations of equation (3).  The propensity score is used to match 
the non-participants (i.e. the comparator group) with the participants (i.e. the treatment 
group) on the basis of a set of observed characteristics summarized in the propensity 
score.
7 A significant difference between the mean incomes (expenditures) of  the two 
matched groups indicates the existence of participation effects on household welfare.   
 
It should be noted that none of the above listed methods is perfect. Our intent in using 
several methods to evaluate the impact of conservancy programs or participation is 
mainly driven by data availability and the potential for checking consistency and 





The Conservancy effect 
 
Table 4 summarizes the impact of established conservancy programs on household 
welfare (measured by household income, per capita income, household expenditure and 
per capita expenditure) relative to comparator conservancies.  We report results from the 
simple comparison without controls and multivariate methods.  The second part of table 4 
shows the differential impact of socio-economic characteristics on household welfare in 
established conservancies. As reported earlier, while our focus here is on household 
income and expenditure measures as indicators of conservancy benefits, these may not 
fully account for other community-level benefits that also occur as a result of 
conservancies.   
 
In Kunene, the simple comparison method indicates, that households in established 
conservancies enjoy significantly higher household and per capita income. However, the 
expenditure measures do not suggest any robust differences in welfare.   
 
In Caprivi, except for per capita income, all the measures of welfare show significant 
differences in standards of living between households in established and comparator 
conservancies.  For example, mean household incomes are 24% higher for households in 
                                                 
7 We used Gaussian kernel matching for households within common support in this analysis.  In kernel 
matching each participating household is matched with the weighted average of all nonparticipating 
households.  The weights are based on the difference in propensity score between the participating and 
each non-participating households.  The standard errors are bootstrapped. 
   13
established conservancies in Caprivi region.  However, because the difference between 
the established and comparator conservancies in Caprivi is only one year, we are less 
confident about these results. 
  
In general, multivariate analysis confirms the results obtained by comparing simple 
means.  The impact (where statistically significant) of established conservancies as 
compared with the comparator group is much smaller compared with the simple 
comparison method. For example, households in established conservancies Kunene enjoy 
29% higher per capita income when the multivariate analysis is used, as opposed to 44% 
with the simple comparison.  Similarly in Caprivi, established conservancies enjoy 58% 
greater per capita expenditure when multivariate analysis is used as opposed to 105% 
with the simple comparison.  The simple comparison results are expected to be biased 
upward as not all the differences in simple comparisons can be attributed to conservancy 
related gains.   
 
Differential impacts of various groups 
 
Here we focus on the differential impact of various socio-economic household 
characteristics on the income of households living in established conservancies. The 
second part of Table 4 shows results of the tests of hypotheses (β1 - β2 - β3) = 0 for 
education, gender, assets, and livestock.  These hypotheses test whether there are 
differences in welfare benefits from established conservancies to households with high 
education, female heads, more assets and more livestock. 
 
For education the differential effect, where statistically significant, is negative.  This 
implies low education households stand to gain more in welfare from established 
conservancies.  In other words, high education is not always translated into bigger 
welfare gains from conservancies.  This may be because most employment opportunities 
created by conservancies are for low skilled workers. 
 
The gender bias hypothesis -- that male-headed households enjoy higher benefits from 
conservancies as compared to their female headed counterparts is rejected in most cases 
in part B of table 4.  Only for household income in Kunene, is (β1 - β2 - β3) negative and 
weakly significant.  In contrast female-headed households in Caprivi enjoy higher net 
expenditure benefits from conservancies. 
 
Similarly part C of table 4, which focuses on asset-poverty, shows that (β1 - β2 - β3) = 0 
cannot be rejected for any of the welfare measures in Kunene and two income measures 
in Caprivi.  That is asset-rich households do not enjoy higher net benefits from 
conservancies when compared with their asset poor counterparts. For expenditure based 
measures in Caprivi, (β1 - β2 - β3) is negative.  That is, asset-poor households are likely to 
gain more from conservancy benefits than their asset-rich counterparts in Caprivi.  This 
suggests that benefits from conservancies are pro-poor in Caprivi and poverty neutral in 
Kunene when poverty is measured in terms of assets.  However, the situation for 
livestock-poor households is ambiguous for the two regions. 
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Determinants of Participation 
 
In this section, we focus on the impact of participation within the established 
conservancies. Participation by households is defined as those reporting that they are 
members of the conservancy.  Membership may have direct and indirect welfare 
implications for households who choose to participate.   
 
Table 5 shows the results of determinants of participation in the two regions.  Most 
factors are not statistically significant in either region.  The peer effect on participation 
measured by the village participation ratio is statistically significant in both regions.  This 
shows that if a household resides in a village with a larger proportion of participants, then 
that household is more likely to be a participant as well.   
 
In Kunene, two other factors show a significant statistical relationship with participation.  
First, households with at least seventh grade and higher education have higher probability 
of participation.   Second, a household with crops or livestock damaged by wild animals 
is more likely to participate in the conservancy.  This suggests that households with 
predation or crop damage problems may view conservancies as a mechanism for 
lobbying for some changes or compensation.   
 
In Caprivi, we find the probability of participation is dependent on household ownership 
of assets, other than livestock. Households with more assets are more likely to 
participate.  
 
Participation and Welfare 
 
Table 6 summarizes the impact of participation on household welfare in the established 
conservancy programs.  
 
The simple comparison method indicates that participant households in established 
conservancies of Kunene enjoy a significantly higher standard of living by all welfare 
measures, except for per capita income.  In Caprivi, only income measures are 
significantly different among participant and non-participant households. 
 
However, multivariate analysis, instrumental variable and propensity score methods 
suggest that the difference in welfare between participant and non-participant households 
is not statistically significant for most of our indicators of welfare.  
 
To summarize our main results on welfare impacts, we find that conservancies have an 
impact household welfare but self-reported participants do not seem to benefit.  Our first 
set of analyses focuses on the conservancy effects.  There are positive welfare gains to 
households in established conservancies relative to new conservancies in both regions.  
Further, households with lower education gain more from conservancy establishment.  
Benefits from conservancies are poverty neutral in Kunene and pro-poor in Caprivi.  
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Our second set of analyses focuses on the effects of household participation within the 
context of established conservancies.  Our multivariate, instrumental variable and 
propensity score analysis do not indicate that participation has a noteworthy effect on 
household welfare within established conservancies.   
     
 6. Conclusions 
 
This paper fills an important gap in improving our understanding of households residing 
in conservancy areas in Namibia. By obtaining information on households in seven 
different conservancies, it allows us to gain useful insights into awareness of and 
perceptions about conservation, household participation in conservancy activities and the 
direct and indirect benefits that accrue as a result. However, because households that 
reside outside conservancies are excluded from this survey, analysis of the impact of 
conservancies is somewhat difficult.  
 
Survey data reveal that a majority of households have limited knowledge about 
conservancies and their activities. Only about 23% of surveyed households knew about 
conservancy plans and some 26% of households had some knowledge about 
conservancies and their constitutions.   Thus, there appears to be is a need for awareness 
creation and education about the role of conservancies and their potential benefits.   
 
Approximately 34% of households report that they are conservancy participants.  Our 
analysis of the determinants of participation indicates that participation is mainly 
influenced by peer-pressure.  Over time, with increased awareness and development of 
the conservancies, participation may become more widespread.  This could potentially 
lead to greater ownership and control over conservancy activities among members. 
 
Households gain from conservancies either through cash income, non-cash rewards and 
community level benefits.  Our survey data show that only a small number of households 
obtain cash income -- some 12% of the surveyed households report conservancy related 
income. While there is likely to be underreporting of income, it is also clear that 
conservancies have not been a source of cash revenues for most households. It should be 
noted that conservancies also provide non-cash income.  For example, some 21% of all 
survey households viewed meat distribution as a benefit of conservancies.  We are unable 
to capture the monetary value of such food subsidies. 
 
The largest percentage of households reporting conservancy-related cash income was 
from the Torra conservancy (27%).  Torra was the first conservancy to be established and 
conservancy income is the major source of income for reporting households.  Thus, as 
conservancies grow into maturity, it is possible that more households will directly 
benefit.   
 
Living within conservancies and close to wildlife also comes with its costs.   Over 50% 
of the households surveyed reported that they suffered crop or livestock damage from 
wildlife.  Thus, conservation of wildlife can also result in signficant expenses to 
households.  This makes it all the more important for households to gain direct income   16
from conservancies. Without this, households may increasingly choose alternate land 
uses over wildlife management. 
 
The main part of our analysis focused on three key questions: (1) Do conservancies 
increase household welfare? (2) How do changes in households' welfare resulting from 
conservancies vary by household socio-economic characteristics?  (3) And, does 
participation in conservancies increase welfare? 
 
Despite data limitations, we are able to conclude that conservancies have an overall 
beneficial effect on household welfare. This result is supported by a simple comparison 
of indicators of welfare as well as multi-variate analyses.  We find that a majority of 
household welfare indicators are higher for established conservancies relative to 
comparator groups.   
 
Our results suggest that the improved welfare effects of conservancies are poverty neutral 
in Kunene and pro-poor in Caprivi. There is little evidence to show that the higher 
educated or the asset-rich are gaining more from conservancies relative to their less 
educated or poor counterparts. Thus, we conclude that conservancies, if not pro-poor, are 
at least not being captured by the elite.  This is an important finding because a potentially 
negative effect of decentralized natural resource management is increased power to 
traditional hierarchies.  Community conservancies in Namibia are doing well on this 
score. 
 
Our multivariate analysis suggests that participants in conservancies do not necessarily 
enjoy higher levels of income or expenditure relative to non-participants. This does not 
mean that individual household level benefits from conservancy development are small.  
Rather, our analysis suggests that the welfare benefits from conservancy development 
may be more evenly distributed between participant and non-participant households than 
expected.   
 
There is both anecdotal evidence, and, evidence from the cost-benefit analysis, of 
significant community level benefits from conservancy creation (Barnes and others 
2002).  While cash benefits are limited, participants and non-participants also enjoy other 
non-cash benefits such as meat, community infrastructure, etc.  These community-wide 
benefits may be the reason why we find that conservancies have a positive impact on the 
average household’s welfare but conservancy participants themselves do not significantly 
gain.  
 
There are several remaining issues that require further research.  There may be specific 
resource or infrastructural characteristics that contribute to welfare gains in the 
consevancies studied in this paper, but our data do not allow us to control for these 
effects.  Further,  there is little known about whether conservancy creation has indirect 
welfare effects (positive or negative) on areas outside conservancies.  Finally, wildlife 
tourism contributes not just to households within conservancies, but also has other 
national benefits.  Our study does not document these.   17
 
Community-based natural resource management faces many other challenges in Namibia.  
The presence of veterinary barriers, such as the foot and mouth disease red line is one 
such challenge.  The somewhat limited high-level government support for wildlife 
management, as evidenced by discrepancies in budget allocation between agriculture and 
natural resource conservation and management (Weaver and Skyer, 2003) is also source 
of concern.  Community conservancies are still in their growth phase.  Our results 
provide some evidence that they have a positive impact on rural welfare.  Thus, it is 
likely that they will survive and gain support despite these challenges.  18
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Table 1:  Key characteristics of conservancy by region 
   Kunene  Caprivi    








bala Mayuni  Kwandu  Total
Year Started  1998 1998 2001 2001 1998 1999 1999 
Total Number of Households  84 210 175 150 206 183 184 1192
Number of Participant  63 80 52 87 53 30 38 403
% Participant  75 38 30 58 26 16 21 34
Average Income  11234 8054 8307 6090 8953 6540 8410 8046
% households with education              
Grade 9 and below  52 71 70 77 34 54 51 58
Grade 10 and above  48 29 30 23 66 46 49 42
% households with electricity  67 519 0 1 4
% female headed households  43 42 41 39 40 42 36 40
% Households with main occupation of head              
Formal employment  35 8 13 8 9 5 5 10
Informal employment  14 15 10 4 12 11 3 10
Subsistence agriculture (includes livestock)  39 65 66 72 50 63 84 64
Cash crop farming  0 0 0 0 14 14 3 5
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Table 2:  Households and conservancy characteristics 
   Kunene  Caprivi    









bala Mayuni  Kwandu Total
Average income from conservancy  11921 5771 3214 3000 4970 5373  1978 5689
# households with conservancy income  26 12 24 6 37 28  14 147
Average wage income from conservancy  2615 1850  967 2541 3866  3136 2578
# households with conservancy wage income  15 8 0 18 26 20  17 104
% households with conservancy payment (1)  27 15 0 9 14 10 8 11
% households with damage by wildlife (2)  35 50 30 31 69 74 86 56
% household with conservancy interaction 
Contributed to Conservancy (q49)  11 20 4 30 7 4  2 11
Know about the Conservancy Plan (q50)  29 18 11 25 25 18  29 21
Consulted with plans (q50a)  39 18 14 27 26 19  28 23
Know the Conservancy Constitution (q51)  49 30 17 32 26 16  24 26
Household's benefit from conservancy (% household) 
Provides jobs to the household members  6 0 0 15 13 8  11 8
Distribute meat to the households  76 62 7 26 2 0  0 21
No advantages  13 37 79 48 44 58  55 49
Note: 1.  The average household income from conservancies are derived from total income reported by household 
members and their corresponding occupational status related to the conservancy (Type B).  Type B occupation includes 
both direct employment by the conservancies as well as wage and enterprise income indirectly arising from the 
conservancy.  If a person reported his / her occupation to be of type B and no secondary occupation, then the total income 
reported by that person is assumed to be from conservancy.  If the person reported primary occupation of type B and 
another secondary occupation not related to conservancy, then 75 percent of his / her income is assumed to be from 
conservancy.  If a person reported type B to be his / her secondary occupation, then 25 percent of his / her income is 
assumed to be from conservancy.  Individual conservancy income are added to obtain household conservancy income. 
          2.   Households reporting conservancy payments as top three contribution to livelihood or cash income are 
included. 
          3.   Households reporting damage to both crops and livestock are included. 
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Table3:  Household characteristics by control and treatment conservancies 
   Kunene Conservancies    Caprivi Conservancies 
   Comparator Established   Comparator Established
Number of households  325 294 367 206
Income 7284 8963 7477 8953
Selected monthly expenditure  715 762 570 1492
Female 16-55  1.6 1.5 1.4 1.6
Male 16-55  1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4
Dependency ratio  1.2 1.0 1.1 1.3
% Household education      
Grade 9 and below  72.9 66.0 52.0 34.0
Grade 10 and above  27.1 34.0 48.0 66.0
% Female education      
Grade 9 and below  72.6 71.8 74.1 51.0
Grade 10 and above  27.4 28.2 25.9 49.0
% households with electricity  3.1 6.5 0.3 8.7
% female headed households  40.3 42.2 39.2 40.3
Most important source of livelihood reported by % households    
Arable production (own use)  2.5 0.0 70.0 46.1
Arable production (cash cropping)  0.3 0.0 1.9 3.4
Livestock production (own use)  41.2 16.3 1.9 6.3
Livestock production (sales)  10.8 24.2 0.3 1.9
Formal employment  10.8 17.4 3.5 6.3
Informal employment  7.1 13.6 2.5 6.3
Pensions 18.8 21.4  7.6 9.7
Note:  Comparator conservancies in Kunene are: Sorri-Sorris and  Ehi-Rovi Puka.  The established  
conservancies are: Torra and ≠Khoadi //Hoâs.  The comparator conservancies in Caprivi are: Mayuni and 
Kwandu.  Salambala is the established conservancy in Caprivi. 
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Table 4:  Key results, impact of conservancy by region         
   Kunene     Caprivi    
1.  Simple Comparison Without Control, Mean Differences in:      
a) Mean Household Income   1299.83*  1702.36**
(Changes in proportion)  (0.20)  (0.24) 
b) Mean Per Capita Income  589.50**  45.53 
(Changes in proportion)  (0.44)  0.03  
c) Mean Household Expenditure  -15.77  757.41**
(Changes in proportion)  (-0.02)  (1.32) 
d) Mean Per Capita Expenditure  17.01  143.13**
(Changes in proportion)  (0.12)  (1.05) 
2.  Multivariate Analysis, (changes in proportion):       
Overall Effects of Conservancy Program       
a) Household Income  0.18  -0.12 
b) Per Capita Income  0.28**  -0.18 
c) Household Expenditure  -0.05  0.63**
d) Per Capita Expenditure  0.04  0.58**
Interaction Effects Between Conservancy Program and:       
A. High Education on:       
a) Household Income  -0.41**  -0.21 
b) Per Capita Income  -0.51**  -0.24 
c) Household Expenditure  0.19  -0.35* 
d) Per Capita Expenditure  0.07  -0.37* 
B. Female headed households:       
a) Household Income  -0.30  0.21 
b) Per Capita Income  -0.23  0.14 
c) Household Expenditure  -0.04  0.32* 
d) Per Capita Expenditure  0.00  0.23 
C. Asset-Rich households:       
a) Household Income  0.03  0.19 
b) Per Capita Income  -0.07  0.14 
c) Household Expenditure  0.13  -0.44* 
d) Per Capita Expenditure  0.03  -0.48* 
D. Livestock-Rich households:       
a) Household Income  -0.03  -0.15 
b) Per Capita Income  -0.22  -0.20 
c) Household Expenditure  0.44**  -0.37* 
d) Per Capita Expenditure  0.24  -0.41  
Note:       
1.        Extreme values of income and expenditure were excluded.  Households with annual income above 50,000 
Namibian dollars and monthly expenditure above 10,000 Namibian dollars were excluded as extreme values. 
Households reporting zero income or expenditure were also excluded. 
2.        Statistical significance of the coefficients are indicated by * for 5 percent and ** for 1 percent.   24
 
Table 5:   Determinants of probability of participation in conservancy   
   Kunene     Caprivi    
Constant -2.38**  -2.89  ** 
 (0.36)  (0.45)   
Grade 7 to 9  0.56**  0.52  
 (0.19)  (0.45)   
Grade 10 and above  0.73**  0.68  
 (0.21)  (0.37)   
Formal employment  0.01  0.31  
 (0.33)  (0.45)   
Informal employment  -0.28  -0.06  
 (0.33)  (0.45)   
Cash crop farming      0.02  
     (0.37)   
Retired 0.09  0.07   
 (0.33)  (0.42)   
Self employment      -0.33  
     (0.51)   
Young adults:16-35  -0.07  0.02  
 (0.05)  (0.05)   
Village Participation ratio  3.40**  3.49 ** 
 (0.33)  (0.46)   
Livestock: Principal Components 0.07  -0.06   
 (0.04)  (0.27)   
Assets: Principal Components  0.07  0.29 ** 
 (0.21)  (0.07)   
Access to Electricity  -0.20  0.00  
 (0.19)  (0.29)   
Months Fuelwood Harvested  0.02  0.04  
 (0.03)  (0.03)   
Crop/Livestock damaged by wild  0.42*  -0.14  
 (0.19)  (0.23)   
Female Headed Households  0.09  0.04  
 (0.16)  (0.21)   
N 236  189   
Log likelihood  -123.94  -77.59  
Pseudo R squared  0.24   0.29   
Note: 
1.      In Kunene some variables did not have sufficient variation between control and 
treatment and were dropped. 
2.     Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. 
3.        Statistical significance of the coefficients are indicated by * for 5 percent and ** for 1 percent. 
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Table 6:  Key results, impact of participation by region in established conservancies     
   Kunene     Caprivi   
1.  Simple Comparison Without Control:        
a) Mean Household Income   1667*  5110** 
(Changes in proportion)  (0.24)  (0.69) 
b) Mean Per Capita Income  177  849** 
(Changes in proportion)  (0.10)  (0.60) 
c) Mean Household Expenditure  286**  218 
(Changes in proportion)  (0.49)  (0.17) 
d) Mean Per Capita Expenditure  54**  7 
(Changes in proportion)  (0.41)  (0.03) 
2.  Multivariate Analysis (Changes in proportion):        
a) Household Income  0.08  0.20 
b) Per Capita Income  0.10  0.25 
c) Household Expenditure  0.11  -0.21 
d) Per Capita Expenditure  0.15  -0.13 
3.  Instrumental Variable Method (Changes in proportion):        
a) Household Income  -0.69  0.50 
b) Per Capita Income  -0.34  0.50 
c) Household Expenditure  0.29  -1.21** 
d) Per Capita Expenditure  0.45  -1.31** 
4.  Propensity Score Matching:        
a) Household Income  2961  1238 
b) Per Capita Income  656  16 
c) Household Expenditure  206  28 
d) Per Capita Expenditure  55   9  
Note:       
1.        Extreme values of income and expenditure were excluded.  Households with annual income above 50,000 
Namibian dollars and monthly expenditure above 10,000 Namibian dollars were excluded as extreme values. 
Households reporting zero income or expenditure were also excluded. 
2.        Statistical significance of the coefficients are indicated by * for 5 percent and ** for 1 percent. 
 
 